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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Rafael Galvan challenges the jury's verdict finding him guilty of first 
degree stalking and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Galvan argues 
the prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment rights through misconduct in 
closing, and that his sentences are excessive. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Rafael Galvan and Lucina Vasquez Galvan had been married for 23 
years, but separated in June of 2011. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 178, Ls. 11-12; p. 180, Ls. 
2-6.) According to Lucina, their marital problems were caused by Galvan's anger 
issues and increasing aggressiveness. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 179, Ls. 3-13.) In July 
2011, Lucina got a protection order against Galvan. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 180, L. 18-
p. 181, L. 21.) Galvan repeatedly violated that order, following Lucina by car 
when she left work. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 218, Ls. 16-23.) At least twice, in August 
2011, Lucina called 911 to report Galvan's violations. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 167, Ls. 
17-19; p. 204, L. 5 - p. 205, L. 18; p. 214, L. 2 - p. 217, L. 19.) 
A final incident happened January 2,2012. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 225, L. 23 - p. 
230, L. 24; 5/15/12 Tr., p. 6, L. 23 - p. 7, L. 2.) On that day, Galvan drove to 
Melaleuca, where Lucina worked, and confronted her in the parking lot. (5/14/12 
Tr., p. 226, L. 5 - p. 230, L. 24.) During the confrontation, Galvan pulled a gun 
and threatened to kill Lucina. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 229, L. 12 -po 230, L. 10; 5/15112 
Tr., p. 6, L. 23 - p. 7, L. 2.) 
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Melaleuca employee Alicia Luna was in the parking lot at the time. 
(5/14/12 Tr., p. 110, Ls. 15-19; p. 112, Ls. 2-5.) Luna saw Galvan - who she 
identified at trial - pull a gun and point it at someone in another car. (5/14/12 Tr., 
p. 112, Ls. 19-25; p. 113, Ls. 11-12; p. 115, Ls. 8-10.) Luna recognized the 
other car as belonging to her coworker Lucina. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 119, Ls. 23-25; p. 
121, Ls. 21-24.) Scared, Luna left the parking lot and went inside where she told 
her work-coordinator, Charity Schuldt, what she had seen. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 119, 
Ls. 15-22.) 
Schuldt called 911, then went out into the parking lot. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 141, 
Ls. 15-17; p. 149, Ls. 1-10.) There, Schuldt heard a male voice arguing and 
yelling, and saw Lucina leaning back in her car. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 149, Ls. 11-17; 
p. 150, Ls. 8-9.) Schuldt saw a man stand up and walk toward his truck, then 
saw Lucina get out of her car and walk toward the building. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 149, 
Ls. 19-24.) According to Schuldt, the man then followed Lucina, but when he 
saw a car come around the corner, he turned, got back in his truck, and left. 
(5/14/12 Tr., p. 149, L. 25 - p. 150, L. 4.) 
Bonneville County Sheriff's Deputy Bryan Summers arrested Galvan at his 
sister's house. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 56, Ls. 8-10; p. 57, Ls. 19-25.) Upon arrest, the 
sister allowed Summers to search one bedroom. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 61, Ls. 4-5, 23-
25.) Galvan was advised of his Miranda rights, and agreed to talk. (5/15/12 Tr., 
p. 63, Ls. 16-22; p. 64, Ls. 4-6.) Galvan admitted that he had gone to Melaleuca 
to see Lucina. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 62, Ls. 5-6.) When Summers asked Galvan 
about a firearm, Galvan did not respond. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 62, Ls. 8-9.) At trial, 
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Galvan testified that when asked, he denied having a gun. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 76, 
Ls. 11-15.) 
In closing, the prosecutor told the jury that the law did not require them to 
believe all evidence before them; rather, it was the jury's duty to assign what 
weight to give the evidence. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 92, Ls. 17-21.) The prosecutor 
argued that testimony by Luna and Schuldt should be given more weight, or 
deemed more credible, than Galvan's. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 93, L. 2 - p. 94, L. 2.) 
The jury found Galvan guilty of first degree stalking and aggravated 
assault with a deadly weapon. (R., pp. 40-41.) The district court sentenced 
Galvan to a term of 10 years with one and a half years fixed as to the January 2, 
2012 incident. (R., pp. 48-49.) As to the stalking incidents between October 5 
and January 2,2012\ the district court sentenced Galvan to a concurrent term of 
four years with one and a half years fixed. (R." pp. 119-20.) Galvan filed 
motions for leniency under Rule 35, which were denied. (R., pp. 51, 64, 133.) 
Galvan timely appealed the judgments and order denying his Rule 35 motion. 
(R., pp. 53-55, 65-67, 122-24.) 
1 The charges, initially filed as two separate cases, were consolidated for trial and 
on appeal. (R., pp. 25, 72.) 
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ISSUES 
Galvan states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the prosecuting attorney violate Mr. Galvan's state right and 
federal right to remain silent and his federal right to due process 
when, without objection, he commented on Mr. Galvan's post-
arrest, post Miranda silence during his closing argument? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years, with one and one-half years fixed, for 
aggravated assault and the deadly weapons enhancement and a 
concurrent sentence of four years, with one and one-half years 
fixed, for stalking in the first degree? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Galvan failed to show his Fifth Amendment rights were violated? 
2. Has Galvan failed to show the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Galvan Has Failed To Show His Fifth Amendment Rights Were Violated 
A. Introduction 
Galvan asserts the prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination in closing argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-10.) Although the 
alleged misconduct was not objected-to at trial, Galvan argues it warrants 
reversal under State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). Galvan 
cannot satisfy his burden here. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court will only review an unobjected-to claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct where the appellant establishes that the alleged 
conduct 
(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) plainly exists ... ; and (3) was not harmless. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28,245 P.3d at 979-80. 
C. Galvan Waived - And Did Not Re-invoke - His Fifth Amendment Right To 
Silence 
Galvan asserts that prosecutorial misconduct violated his Fifth 
Amendment and due process rights, thus satisfying the first prong of Perry. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) In support, Galvan cites United States and Idaho 
Supreme Court case law providing that a prosecutor may not use "post-arrest, 
post-Miranda silence to impeach or as substantive evidence of guilt." (Id. (citing 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 
5 
610 (1976); State v. Dougherty, 142 Idaho 1,121 P.3d 416 (Ct. App. 2005).) But 
critically, Galvan's analysis assumes - and omits discussion whether - Galvan's 
Fifth Amendment rights were implicated. The record shows they were not. 
It is undisputed that Galvan was advised of his Miranda rights. (5/15/12 
Tr., p. 63, Ls. 16-22.) It is also undisputed that, after being so advised, Galvan 
agreed to talk, and did answer questions by Deputy Summers. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 
64, Ls. 4-6; p. 76, Ls. 11-15.) Where a suspect, understanding his rights, makes 
a voluntary statement to police, "he waivers] his right to remain silent." Berghuis 
v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, _, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010). Thus, the record 
shows that Galvan waived his right to silence. 
Having waived his right to silence, Galvan was in the same position -
with respect to invoking Fifth Amendment rights - as the defendant in 
Thompkins. In that case, Thompkins was Mirandized, but never expressly 
invoked his Fifth Amendment rights - either verbally or in writing. 1st at 2256. 
He was then "largely silent during the interrogation, which lasted about three 
hours." 1st (internal quotes and brackets omitted). "About two hours and 45 
minutes into the interrogation," Thompkins admitted "shooting that boy down." 
1st at 2257. Thompkins contended he "invoked his privilege to remain silent by 
not saying anything for a sufficient period of time." 1st at 2259 (quotes and 
brackets omitted). The Court rejected this argument, holding, for purposes of 
Miranda, that invocation of the right to silence must be "unambiguous." 1st at 
2259-60 (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)). Just as 
Thompkins' hours of silence did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, Galvan's 
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seconds of silence after waiving his right to silence were equally ineffective to 
invoke his Fifth Amendment rights. See State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 524-25, 50 
P.3d 1014, 1019-20 (2002) (reinvocation of Miranda rights after waiver must be 
'''clear and unambiguous,'" quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). 
Decisions cited by Galvan are distinguishable. In Ellington, Doyle, and 
Dougherty, unlike here, there was no waiver. See Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61, 
253 P.3d at 735; Doyle, 426 U.S. 619; Dougherty, 142 Idaho at 3, 121 P.3d at 
419. In those cases, the defendants either invoked and did not waive Fifth 
Amendment rights (Dougherty), or remained silent without invoking or waiving 
their rights (Ellington and Doyle). 19.:. In contrast, Galvan undisputedly waived 
his right to silence, and did not re-invoke it. 
The decision in State v. Cobell, 148 Idaho 349, 223 P.3d 291 (Ct. App. 
2009), is also distinguishable from Galvan's case. There, the defendant 
received Miranda warnings and signed a waiver form. Cobell, 148 Idaho at 351, 
223 P.3d at 293. But after answering questions by police, Cobell then "told 
detectives he did not wish to speak to them." 19.:. The Cobell court held that the 
trial court's decision allowing use at trial of defendant's silence after he invoked 
his right was harmless error, and thus affirmed. Cobell, 148 Idaho at 353, 223 
P.3d at 295. 
Applying Thompkins, decided a year after Cobell, the trial court in that 
case did not err. Rather, the prosecution's use of the defendant's post-Miranda, 
post-waiver failure or refusal to answer questions was constitutionally valid. See 
Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. at 2264. This is because Due Process's implied 
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assurance that a defendant's silence will not be used against him applies only 
when the Fifth Amendment has been - and remains - invoked. See Dougherty, 
142 Idaho at 4 (citing 142 Idaho at 4 (citing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618); Thompkins, 
130 S.Ct. at 2264. 
Galvan waived his Miranda rights and never invoked the right to silence. 
(5/15/12 Tr., p. 62, Ls. 5-9.) Under Thompkins, Galvan's responses and non-
responses during voluntary questioning were properly admitted. Thompkins, 130 
S.Ct. at 2264; see also Salinas v. Texas, _ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 2174, 2178, 2181 
(2013) (privilege against self-incrimination, must be expressly invoked; simply 
remaining silent will not invoke the privilege). Accordingly, the prosecutor's 
comments in closing argument addressing properly admitted evidence did not 
violate an unwaived constitutional right, and were not plain error. Galvan thus 
fails to satisfy the first two prongs of Perry. 
D. The Record Supports That The Prosecutor's Erroneous Comment Was 
Harmless 
Even if the first two prongs of Perry were satisfied, the appellate court will 
not reverse where it concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent the 
alleged error, the outcome of trial would have been the same. State v. Thumm, 
153 Idaho 533, 543, 285 P.3d 348, 358 (Ct. App. 2012). Given the 
overwhelming evidence admitted at trial, Galvan fails demonstrate this final 
prong under Perry. 
Lucina's testimony about Galvan's protection order violations in August 
2011 was supported by testimony from Bonneville County Sheriff's Deputy 
Broderick. (5/14/12 Tr. ,po 167, Ls. 17-19; p. 204, L. 5 - p. 205, L. 18; p. 214, L. 
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2 - p. 217, L. 19; p. 218, Ls. 16-23; p. 225, L. 23 - p. 230, L. 24; 5/15/12 Tr., p. 
57, Ls. 19-21.) Lucina's testimony about the January 2012 incident at Melaleuca 
was corroborated by testimony from Melaleuca employees Luna and Schuldt. 
(5/14/12 Tr., p. 112, Ls. 19-25; p. 113, Ls. 11-12; p. 115, Ls. 8-10; p. 149, Ls. 11-
17; p. 149, L. 25 - p. 150, L. 4; p. 150, Ls. 8-9; p. 229, L. 12 - p. 230, L. 10; 
5/15/12 Tr., p. 6, L. 23 - p. 7, L. 2.) Luna and Schuldt did not know Lucina well; 
the record does not support a reason to discredit their testimonies. (5/14/12 Tr., 
p. 122, Ls. 9-13; p. 140, Ls. 5-6.) 
Also, Luna was consistent and firm that she saw Galvan point a gun at 
Lucina. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 116, Ls. 19-25; p. 129, Ls. 17-24.) Luna testified that, 
since the incident, her husband had taken her out shooting, and she was even 
more "convinced that what [she] saw was a real gun." (5/14/12 Tr., p. 118, Ls. 6-
10; p. 130, Ls. 4-5.) 
Lucina testified that she feared Galvan's escalating aggressiveness. 
(5/14/12 Tr., p. 179, Ls. 10-16; p. 183, Ls. 13-17; p. 187, Ls. 4-14; p. 188, Ls. 10-
22.) During an incident in August when Galvan followed her in her car down the 
highway, he hit her car with his. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 195, L. 1 - p. 196, L. 11.) 
Lucina testified that she "was always ascared (sic) of him." (5/14/12 Tr., p. 199, 
Ls. 11-12.) And since they separated, "he wasn't getting any better ... he was 
getting worse and worse," and she believed "he was going to get to a point that 
he will do something." (5/14/12 Tr., p. 199, Ls. 12-17.) 
In the Melaleuca incident in January 2012, Lucina testified that Galvan 
was calm at first, but got upset when she told him they were not going to get 
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back together. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 228, Ls. 2-8.) Lucina testified that he ordered her 
to get into his car or he would kill her. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 228, Ls. 9-11.) Galvan 
became increasingly angry, pulled a gun, and said he would kill her, then 
himself. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 229, Ls. 1-5.) Lucina testified that she begged him, "If 
you ever loved me, don't ... kill me, because my kids need me." (5/15/12 Tr., p. 
14, Ls. 15-20.) Galvan told her, "I won't do it because I love you so much and 
because of my kids." (5/15/12 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 21-22.) But he told her not to call 
the police, saying he would "never forgive" her for the first time he had ended up 
in jail. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 13-18.) 
In sharp contrast, Galvan testified he went to Melaleuca to tell Lucina he 
had no money for child support and was moving out of state. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 70, 
Ls. 6-10.) Galvan testified they did not argue. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 72, Ls. 19-20.) 
He did not pull out a gun. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 72, Ls. 16-18.) He did not threaten 
Lucina. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 72, Ls. 19-20.) Instead, they talked; and after they 
talked, she kissed him. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 72, Ls. 22-23.) 
When Deputy Summers arrested Galvan at his sister's house, Galvan 
agreed to talk. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 64, Ls. 4-6.) Summers testified that when he 
asked Galvan about having a firearm at Melaleuca, Galvan did not respond. 
(5/15/12 Tr., p. 62, Ls. 8-9.) When Galvan testified, he acknowledged being 
asked if he had had a gun at Melaleuca. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 76, Ls. 11-13.) In 
conflict with Deputy Summers' testimony, Galvan testified that he denied having 
had a gun. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 76, Ls. 14-15.) 
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Given the record from trial, there is ample evidence for this Court to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's improper comment 
did not affect the outcome of his trial. Stated another way, the jury's guilty 
verdict did not turn on the prosecutor's comment. Instead, the record supports 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Galvan guilty even if 
the prosecutor had not commented in closing argument that a reasonable person 
would have adamantly denied having a gun. Accordingly, Galvan has failed to 
establish fundamental error warranting reversal. 
II. 
Galvan Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
The appellate court will not disturb a sentence that is within statutory limits 
absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 
P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted). Galvan does not dispute that his 
sentence was within statutory limits. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) In reviewing for 
abuse of discretion, the appellate court considers whether the district court (1) 
was aware its decision was discretionary, (2) acted within the scope of its 
discretion and consistent with applicable law, and (3) reached its decision 
through exercise of reason. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 
941 (2011). 
To meet his burden on appeal, Galvan must show his sentence is 
excessive "under any reasonable view of the facts," considering the objectives of 
criminal punishment: protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution or punishment. Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 P.3d at 313. In 
reviewing an excessive sentence claim, the appellate court independently 
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reviews the record, examining the nature of the offense, and the offender's 
character. State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132, 267 P.3d 709, 719 (2011) 
(citation omitted). Where reasonable minds could differ as to whether a 
sentence is excessive, the appellate court will not disturb it. Miller, 151 Idaho at 
834, 264 P.3d at 941 (citation omitted). 
Galvan cites, as mitigating factors, that he has a very minimal criminal 
record, that he is amenable to rehabilitation, and has owned his own roofing 
business for six years. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-15.) The offenses here were 
crimes of domestic violence against his wife of 23 years, who has since divorced 
him. (See 5/14/12 Tr., p. 178, Ls. 11-12; p. 178, Ls. 16-17.) Given the personal 
and specific nature of Galvan's crime, the fact that he has an otherwise minimal 
criminal record warrants little consideration. 
In his presentence investigation, Galvan never acknowledged nor 
accepted any responsibility for his crime. 
"admitted violence toward his daughter." 
(PSI, pp. 3-4, 11.) Galvan also 
(PSI, p. 11.) Although Galvan's 
counsel argued at sentencing that he "has finally come to the determination he 
doesn't want anything to do with his former spouse," this is not corroborated in 
the PSI. (7/14/12 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 13-15; see PSI.) In his statement to the court, 
Galvan said, "The only thing I want to say that I was not at fault for what 
happened ... I was not at fault in my marriage ... I am not going to follow her 
and I'm not going to live for her, but she is the one that messed up in our 
marriage." Galvan's utter refusal to accept any responsibility for his crimes casts 
considerable doubt on his rehabilitative potential. 
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The district court noted for the record that it considered the PSI as well as 
the objectives of criminal punishment, including "protection of society, deterrence 
... , the possibility of rehabilitation and punishment." (7/24/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 15-
21.) The court also considered I.C. § 19-2521 as to Galvan's potential for 
probation. 
The court highlighted that Galvan's domestic violence evaluation showed 
his re-offense danger was, on a scale of one to ten (ten being highest), eight with 
treatment, and ten without treatment. (PSI, pp. 9; Attached Exhibit (Therapeutic 
Interventions Evaluation); 7/24/12 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 14-16.) The court also 
expressed concern about Galvan's refusal to accept responsibility, and his 
statement to the court blaming his wife. (7/24/12 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 16-20.) Galvan's 
persistence in blaming his wife and his refusal to accept responsibility caused 
the court to question Galvan's statement that he was not going to have anything 
to do with her. (7/24/12 Tr., p. 21, L. 21 - p. 22, L. 5.) 
Ultimately, the court imposed a term of ten years with one and one-half 
years fixed as to the aggravated assault charge. (7/24/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 9-12.) 
The court imposed a term of four years with one and one half years fixed as to 
the stalking charge. (7/24/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 13-17.) The sentences were 
imposed to run concurrently. (7/24/12 Tr., p. 22, L. 18.) Given the nature of the 
crimes and evidence supporting Galvan's high probability of re-offense, these 
sentences were generous in their leniency. Galvan has failed to show the 
sentences were excessive, or that the district court abused its discretion, under 
any reasonable view of the facts. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2013. 
D~ Deputy torney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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